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Abstract

In any given election, aspirants without party approvals still have the incentive to run as independent candidates. In the face of the competition with patty nominees, unsuccessful aspirants could insist on campaigning against nominating candidates or determine to withdraw from the contests. The purpose of this study is to examine the reasons for unsuccessful aspirants decide to run as candidates or to withdraw from elections. It is hypothesized that both political patties and aspirants are rational decision makers in an attempt to minimize electoral costs and meanwhile maximize the benefits. The aspirants without party blessings could decide not to run in elections if they calculate that the fixed electoral costs exceed the expected payoffs. This study employs a three-stage game model to reach some corollaries based on the subgame perfect equilibriums for political parties and unnominated aspirants. The findings reveal that political parties are always unable to deter unsuccessful aspirants from being independent candidates, and then one common strategy is to boycott the aspirants in the elections. However, political patties could learn that adopting defense tactics will pay more costs than tolerating the aspirants to run as mavericks. As a result, the unsuccessful aspirants should wage campaign activities when they perceive that political parties claiming to use deterrent strategies are just bluffs and therefore ”incredible threats.”

Abstract

Unlike conventional presidential elections in which ethnic identity, unification and independence, and economic development were the core issues of political competitions, in the 2012 presidential election, the issue of social justice and redistribution firstly was included in the candidates' platforms. This article investigates the question of redistribution from the theoretical perspectives and political competition, and explains the variation in the voters' opinions on this issue. By incorporating the TEDS 2012 data with structural equation modeling, we find that the theories of classical political economy, the supply theory of public goods, and party identity all provide explanations for this issue. In addition, we also find that although the cross-strait economic and trade exchange does not directly influence people's opinions toward redistribution, nevertheless, it impacts their attitudes toward their future household income, and indirectly affects their standpoints on the redistributive issues.

Abstract

This study aims to analyze voter behavior in the 2020 Kaohsiung mayoral recall election from the perspective of rational choice. Using an integrated framework of the theoretical models and empirical analysis (EITM), this study examines whether voter behavior varies due to differences in the electoral and recall systems, taking into account instrumental and consumptive motivations. By applying the settings of additively separable utility and lexicographic preferences, probit model and mediation models are used to analyze whether voters voted to support the recall or not. Data used is provided by the Election Study Center of National Chengchi University. Empirical analysis indicates that party identification and the evaluation of mayoral performance are statistically significant in explaining voter’s decisions. In addition, the evaluation of mayoral performance is a mediator as well. Party identification not only exerts a direct effect on recall voting behavior but also indirectly influences whether voters support or oppose the recall through their evaluation. Furthermore, the study highlights that voters primarily consider party affiliation, indicating that party mobilization plays a significant role in the success or failure of recall efforts. Moreover, the effect of comprehensive evaluation on recall voting behavior is substantial, highlighting that political parties can accurately assess the likelihood of recall success only when they possess information about voters’ evaluations. Additionally, the direct effect of party identification is relatively small, while the indirect effect is substantial, indicating that more than half of the voter evaluations is mediated by partisan biases. The results of both empirical models suggest that an effective party mobilization and a compressive understanding of public opinion are keys to the success of a political party in a recall election, and the relative magnitudes of their direct and indirect effects warrant attention.