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Abstract
This study explores the changes in voters’ choices due to the delayed voting in the 2018 Taipei City mayoral election. During the election, the incumbent mayor, Wen-je Ko, faced strong challenges from Shou-chung Ting (Kuomintang) and Pasuya Yao (Democratic Progressive Party). When voting stations started to count votes at 4 pm, most news channels reported an extremely tight race between Ko and Ting. The final election outcome was a narrow-margined win for Ko. For Shou-chung Ting, the outcome was very controversial, as this election was held concurrently with a referendum and hence the voting time was seriously delayed. A substantial proportion of voters cast their votes after 4 pm, already aware of the results of other voting stations from news reports. This information was likely to lead to changes in voters’ choices, resulting in further strategic voting and changes in the final outcome of the election. In order to examine Ting’s argument, this paper collects the election results of each voting station and the registration time after the counting was completed and published by the Central Election Commission. Through spatial regressions (SLM and SEM) and geographic weighted regression (GWR), we find that at the village level, some votes indeed flowed. However, at the city level, Shou-chung Ting’s concern has no empirical support. The overall impact of the delayed voting on the three candidates was insignificant.
Abstract
This study aims to review the causes of infrastructure becoming an idle space and the relationship between public investment and the voting rate in presidential elections. The research applied structuration theory as an analysis framework, and screened 440 items of idle space data of the Public Works Committee, and used the socio-economic statistical data of the important indicators of the Open Data in Government networks. The spatial analysis method is used to establish the vote-rate model in 2004 and 2012 for analysis. The research results show that there is a significant and positive relationship between public investment and vote rate in presidential campaigns.
According to the structuration theoretical explanation, under distribution politics, public investment has become a form of ribbon-cutting media and blind investment. Electoral political considerations are better than market assessments. The “ritual” of election mobilization and the habitus of the system that consumes budgets explain the cause of idle space. There is an urgent need to establish professional rational assessment, community participation, information disclosure, public supervision, and accountability mechanisms to improve the phenomenon of political interference in elections and public investment.
