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Abstract

Cognitive madisoniansim is crucial in political situations. It is not only an important value of democratic societies, but also a factor in explaining split-ticket voting. With the increase of minor parties and candidates, the media believe that Taiwan’s 2016 general elections have shown the most fierce split-ticket voting. It is worth mentioning that we shall not ignore the issue of endogeneity caused by partisanship when discussing the relationship between cognitive madisoniansim and split-ticket voting. Based on the panel data of TEDS2016, this study aims to recategorize the cognitive madisoniansim of the respondents and resolve the issue of endogeneity by applying a generalized structural equation model (GSEM). By doing so, we aim to examine the relationship between cognitive madisoniansim and splitticket voting.
The findings show that the public’s cognitive madisoniansim was indeed affected by party preference. DPP supporters have tended to support cognitive madisoniansim in the past. However, they stopped supporting it once the DDP took over the government. The KMT showed the opposite situation. They had been against cognitive madisoniansim in the past. When they began losing elections, they started to support it. Regarding voting decisions, cognitive madsoniansim has positive effects on people’s decisions about straight-ticket voting or split-ticket voting. Nevertheless, most voters who cast straight-ticket voting for the DPP are those who stopped supporting or constantly supported cognitive madisoniansim. These two groups of voters both prefer the DDP. This result indicates that the effect of voters’ cognitive madisoniansim on their voting behaviors still reflects their party preference. The above-mentioned issues present the endogeneity issue derived by explaining the split-ticket voting behaviors by cognitive madisoniansim and the inevitability of GSEM methods. We suggest that researchers not ignore the effect of party preference as they examine the relationship between cognitive madisoniansim and split-ticket voting.

Keywords

cognitive madisonianism
split-ticket voting
endogeneity
GSEM
party preference

Abstract

How voters cast their votes in successive elections determines not only the fate of candidates but also the rise and fall of political parties and sometimes even causes party system changes. The subject of electoral stability and change, due to its significance in theory and practice, has long attracted the attention of political scientists around the world. Despite the voluminous publications cumulated so far, however, there are still heated debates regarding how best to model this dynamic electoral process and to estimate the amount of changes. The purpose of this paper is two-folds. First, it clarifies some confusion in the literature caused by its failing to distinguish gross change from net change and to recognize the strengths and weaknesses of various types of data in evaluating these two changes. After pointing out how panel data prevail over repeated cross-sections and aggregate data in estimating both forms of changes, we then proceed to identify a statistical model that best fits the categorical measurement of electoral changes dominant in panel surveys. The second part of this paper, therefore, pinpoints discrete-time discrete-state Markov chain models as ideal tools for describing the dynamic electoral process and further analyzing the sources of change patterns. The transition probabilities of Markov models coincide with the theoretical concepts of flow-of-the-votes and reflect the way state dependence shapes the trajectories of electoral changes. Finally, we apply a mixed Markov model to the three-wave Japanese Election Study (JES) panel data set to illustrate the potential of this technique.

Keywords

electoral stability and change
straight-and split-ticket voting
dynamic process
panel data
gross change
net change
Markov chain models

Abstract

The 1990s witnessed an explosion in electoral reforms, especially in adopting the ”mixed electoral systems” which combine the features of both single-member districts (SMD) and proportional representation (PR). In January 1994, the Japanese Diet passed the law that replaced the single nontransferable vote (SNTV), in use since 1947, with a mixed-member majoritarian (MMM) system. Voters cast two votes in this new electoral system: a candidate vote in an SMD, and a party-list vote in the list tier portion of the ballot. The 1996 House election was the first test of the MMM system in Japan. The purpose of this article is to assess the effects of this electoral system change based on the 1996 post-election survey of the Japanese Election Study (JES). We focus particularly on the straight-and split-ticket voting patterns for the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and their determinants. Our study indicates that straight-ticket rate was pretty high among the LDP supporters. That is, 80.16% of those who voted for an LDP candidate in an SMD also voted for the LDP on a party-list vote. A further analysis reveals that the LDP identifiers and the more conservative were much more likely to cast straight votes for the LDP, but on the other hand voters with college-level or higher education were less likely to do so. We also find that between two types of ticket-splitters, the percentage of voters who voted for an LDP candidate in an SMD and yet for the non-LDP on a party-list ballot was higher than those who voted the other around. This is probably due to the fact that some non-LDP party identifiers voted strategically in SMDs for the largest party's (i.e., the LDP) candidates, on the one hand, and yet voted sincerely for the non-LDP on the party-list ballot.

Keywords

Straight-Ticket Voting
Split-Ticket Voting
Mixed Electoral Systems
Mixed-Member Majoritarian System
the Liberal Democratic Party LDP

Abstract

Mixed or Hybrid electoral system, a combination of single-member district with plurality (SMD) and proportional representation (PR), has drawn a lot of attention from all over the world in the past few years. Recent studies have focused on its characters and classifications, its impact on the diversified social development, the connection with strategic voting behavior, the interaction with the campaign strategy and party competition, and the formulation of new party system. Based on the survey conducted by Japanese Election Study (JES) and Taiwanese Election and Democratization Study (TEDS), we compare the dynamic voting behaviors between Japan and Taiwan, since both of them follow the same routine of electoral transformation from SNTV to Mixed system. The results show there do have some difference, especially the ticket splitting of the two ballots and the voting stability during system transition, between two countries. From the cross sectional data analysis, we find KMT and DPP received more consistent support in two separate ballots, comparing with the major parties in Japan. As for the panel data results, the convergence to major parties is confirmed in both countries while the trend is more obvious in Taiwan once again. In short, we find the small parties in Taiwan have relative little room for competition, comparing with those in Japan, under new Mixed system. The formulation of two party system is quite noticeable in Taiwan.

Keywords

Mixed system
Japan House Election
Taiwan Legislative Election
strait-and split-ticket voting
voting stability and change

Abstract

Three-in-one election held on November 27th 2010 is the first five metropolitan elections in the history of Taiwan's local elections. Voters in this election could cast three ballots for different political positions: mayor, city councilor, and head of li. This study focuses on the Kaohsiung city and analyzes voters' straight- and split-ticket voting in the 2010 three-in-one election.In general, the character of electoral competition is shaped by electoral systems and the level of election. Single-member district with plurality system is considered to contribute to a competition between two major parties, whereas minor parties are more likely to survive under the SNTVMMD system. In the 2010 Kaohsiung mayoral election, then DPP incumbent Kaohsiung County Magistrate Chiu-hsing Yang ran for mayoral election as an independent candidate and replaced the KMT candidate, Chao-shun Huang, as the major competitor of incumbent mayor, Chu Chen. Our study finds that indeed some pan-blue partisans voted for Yang strategically in the mayoral election. This finding to an extent confirms the rumor of ”dump Huang and save Yang” before the election.Meanwhile, most of those pan-blue partisans who voted Yang for mayor remained to support pan-blue candidates in the city councilor election, showing a split-ticket voting pattern. In contrast, pan-green partisans demonstrated a high degree of loyalty to the DPP mayoral candidate, Chu Chen, and the pan-green candidates in the city councilor elections.As for the lowest-level election of head of li, our study shows that there is no significant relationship between vote choice of head of li and that of mayor and city councilor. This finding indicates that the character of the election of head of li is quite different from that of mayor and councilor election.

Keywords

three-in-one election
straight- and split-ticket voting
strategic voting
ecological regression
party competition

Abstract

Along with the democratic development of Taiwanese politics and the diversification of information channels, voters now have access to abundant information prior to elections. Owing to this, the final decision of some voters might be swayed by changes in public opinion polls or by the collective will of groups of people. The actual vote of these citizens may not be what they originally preferred, which cannot be characterized as sincere voting behavior. In the investigation of different types of non-sincere voting behavior, strategic voting is undoubtedly a major research issue among scholars of election studies delving into voter psychology. Strategic voting primarily refers to voters who decide to cast their votes for candidates with better prospects of winning so as to avoid “wasting” their vote. Past overseas literature has confirmed that whether in single-member districts or in proportional representation or multi-member districts, strategic voting has been observed among voters. As for academia in Taiwan, increasing effort has been made in recent years to study strategic voting that may take place in domestic elections, and the definition and measurement of related concepts, such as the effect of split-ticket and party voting. Most studies, however, are confined to observing the results of split-ticket voting, from which they surmise the possibility of strategic voting. In fact, the actual motivation for strategic voting may be very diverse, but the definition of sincere voting is relatively clear and uncontroversial.
Instead, this study attempts to base itself mainly on post-election panel records provided by Taiwan’s Election and Democratization Study (TEDS), together with an integrated consideration of a pre- and post- election survey and a comparison of election outcomes. With Taiwan’s 2012 presidentialcum- parliamentary elections as the source of empirical evidence, this study adopts counterfactual reasoning and literature on the random utility model, applying them to revise the survey results of the original poll data so as to estimate a reasonable proportion of actual sincere voting. Furthermore, it sums up important characteristics of sincere voters who had different vote choices and demonstrated the subtle differences between split-ticket voting, sincere voting and strategic voting. Finally, the study discusses the various statistical differences between these three voting behaviors.

Keywords

sincere voting
strategic voting
split-ticket voting
counterfactual reasoning
random utility model