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Abstract

Three-in-one election held on November 27th 2010 is the first five metropolitan elections in the history of Taiwan's local elections. Voters in this election could cast three ballots for different political positions: mayor, city councilor, and head of li. This study focuses on the Kaohsiung city and analyzes voters' straight- and split-ticket voting in the 2010 three-in-one election.In general, the character of electoral competition is shaped by electoral systems and the level of election. Single-member district with plurality system is considered to contribute to a competition between two major parties, whereas minor parties are more likely to survive under the SNTVMMD system. In the 2010 Kaohsiung mayoral election, then DPP incumbent Kaohsiung County Magistrate Chiu-hsing Yang ran for mayoral election as an independent candidate and replaced the KMT candidate, Chao-shun Huang, as the major competitor of incumbent mayor, Chu Chen. Our study finds that indeed some pan-blue partisans voted for Yang strategically in the mayoral election. This finding to an extent confirms the rumor of ”dump Huang and save Yang” before the election.Meanwhile, most of those pan-blue partisans who voted Yang for mayor remained to support pan-blue candidates in the city councilor election, showing a split-ticket voting pattern. In contrast, pan-green partisans demonstrated a high degree of loyalty to the DPP mayoral candidate, Chu Chen, and the pan-green candidates in the city councilor elections.As for the lowest-level election of head of li, our study shows that there is no significant relationship between vote choice of head of li and that of mayor and city councilor. This finding indicates that the character of the election of head of li is quite different from that of mayor and councilor election.

Abstract

Political parties enlist voter support from electoral mobilization. It not only helps the party’s candidate win the election but also cultivates political talents and builds the party’s strength for sustainable development. In the election of local public officials in 2018, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) led to social controversy due to the implementation of a few reform policies in the central government, which led to a significant reduction in the seats of mayors and county magistrates and a decline in the share of votes. On the contrary, the Kuomintang (KMT) benefited from the atmosphere of “Dislike DPP,” and the “Han Wave (韓流)” originated in Kaohsiung city, which made a huge gain in the mayor and county magistrate elections and got higher vote shares. From the perspective of party politics, beneath the surface of one party’s gain and another party’s loss in the local-level elections, one topic that deserves attention is whether the political power of the political parties in local politics has changed after Taiwan has experienced three times party alternations? And from the perspective of the analysis of the aggregate data, what is the political meaning of the topic of removing the party label in the local election?
This study mainly took the 2018 local public officers’ elections in Taiwan as an example. We collects the data of the local elections in the past 10 years and crosschecks the results of the national referendum held at the same time as the 2018 election. The methods which are used in this study to examine difference and correlation of votes gained by the DPP, KMT, and independent candidates in various levels of local elections included descriptive statistics, data visualization, analysis of (partial) correlation, ecological regression, and principal component analysis. The findings including: (1) the phenomenon of de-labeling of political parties in the lower-level elections is more obvious in local elections, especially the KMT label; (2) while the party label will still reduce the votes of independent candidates, but the party label may also be hidden in the election; (3) the voter’s attitude towards referendum issues can assist in judging their political affiliation and establishing an “alternative” political map; (4) in addition to mayoral elections, the more support the KMT’s position, the less vote for independent candidates.