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Abstract
Three-in-one election held on November 27th 2010 is the first five metropolitan elections in the history of Taiwan's local elections. Voters in this election could cast three ballots for different political positions: mayor, city councilor, and head of li. This study focuses on the Kaohsiung city and analyzes voters' straight- and split-ticket voting in the 2010 three-in-one election.In general, the character of electoral competition is shaped by electoral systems and the level of election. Single-member district with plurality system is considered to contribute to a competition between two major parties, whereas minor parties are more likely to survive under the SNTVMMD system. In the 2010 Kaohsiung mayoral election, then DPP incumbent Kaohsiung County Magistrate Chiu-hsing Yang ran for mayoral election as an independent candidate and replaced the KMT candidate, Chao-shun Huang, as the major competitor of incumbent mayor, Chu Chen. Our study finds that indeed some pan-blue partisans voted for Yang strategically in the mayoral election. This finding to an extent confirms the rumor of ”dump Huang and save Yang” before the election.Meanwhile, most of those pan-blue partisans who voted Yang for mayor remained to support pan-blue candidates in the city councilor election, showing a split-ticket voting pattern. In contrast, pan-green partisans demonstrated a high degree of loyalty to the DPP mayoral candidate, Chu Chen, and the pan-green candidates in the city councilor elections.As for the lowest-level election of head of li, our study shows that there is no significant relationship between vote choice of head of li and that of mayor and city councilor. This finding indicates that the character of the election of head of li is quite different from that of mayor and councilor election.
Abstract
Political conflicts between the pan-blue camp and the pan-green camp have been increasingly severe since the 1990's. Whether Taiwanese politics has become more polarized hence is an important issue on research agenda. This study analyzes survey data collected after 1996-2012 presidential elections, exploring the degree of political polarization and the factors affecting political polarization in Taiwan. It is found that political polarization appeared in Taiwan since 2000 and then continuously increased until 2008. The polarization was the product of the clash of partisanship, instead of mass attitude of ＂U shaped distribution＂ on unification-independence issues. Regarding the causes of political polarization, people's partisanship and political involvement are main factors. People who have strong partisanship and high level of political involvement are more likely to become political polarized. In addition, the elder and the less educated people are also more possible to become polarized. As to the effect of election results on political polarization, longitudinal survey data are needed to do further analysis. In conclusion, the author suggests that efforts of political elites and the citizens to adjust their issue positions might not diminish political polarization. For a better solution, party elites and mass media in Taiwan should adopt rational communication instead of emotional mobilization.
Abstract
We investigate the relationship between environmental protests and parties' vote shares. Whether environmental protest contributes to the vote share of the Green party? As Green party emphasizes environment protection, people who suffer from environmental pollution is more likely to endorse Green Party. If not, what are the factors behind the situation? We collect and categorize environmental protest data between 1987 and 2009. Applying GIS and spatial analysis, we collapse protest events by township and issue types. Combining legislative election results, we analyze the influence of environmental protests on the vote shares of parties. The empirical result shows that anti-industrial pollution protests exert the most significant effect on party vote share but the influence varies across parties. First, anti-industrial pollution protest is not significantly associated with the vote share of Green Party. The larger the number of anti-industrial pollution protest in a township, the higher the DPP's vote share and the lower the KMT's vote share. For the other types of environmental protests, we do not find comparable effect of protests on vote sharing. In this article we also find that it is socio-economic status of a township rather than the intensity of environmental protest that affect the electoral performance of Green party. Finally, the empirical model also demonstrates the significance of neighborhood effect on parties' vote shares.
Abstract
Observing the process of the recent elections in Taiwan, we found that different political parties often negotiated with each other for the possibility of cooperation. Each party would decide whether to cooperate or not. This paper develops a threeparty game theoretical model of single-seat elections to analyze the conditions under which that minor political party would agree to cooperate with major political parties, and discusses the rationality of decision from each political party. According to the equilibrium results, cooperation between political parties only occurs when certain conditions are met. The cooperative partner is not restricted to the most powerful party. In addition, there is a separating equilibrium in the case of asymmetric information. This leads to the conclusion that the larger difference between the strong type and the weak type of the major political party is, the more common minor political party would cooperate with the weak type of the major political party. Moreover, no cooperation takes place when the minor political party has zero cost in political elections.
