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Abstract

This paper examines the major parties' vote-equalizing strate-gies and the impacts of these strategies on candidates' vote-distribu-tion under a SNTV electoral system. From this perspective, this study tries to observe party competition and party politics in Taiwan since the 1980s. Based on a study on legislative elections from 1983 to 1995, this paper shows some research findings. First, the KMT uses the local factions and "responsibility zone system" to mobilize and allocate potential votes to her candidates. Therefore, the vote-distribution of the KMT candidates tends to be concentrated on some parts of the electoral district. On the other hand, the DPP and NP cannot be helped by the local organizations so that the vote shares of their candidates tend to be scattered across the district. Secondly, from a longitudinal perspective, the vote shares of the KMT candidates are getting scattered. This tendency has become evident since the end of the 1980s, when the opposition parties were gradually organized and institutionalized. Thirdly, the influence of the local factions has gradually become weak because of the devel-opment of social economy and the emergence of the opposition par-ties. All of these tendencies show that the KMT's campaign system which depends on vote allocation, local factions and grass-root organizations has become shaky.

Keywords

SNTV electoral system
Vote-equalizing strategy
Legislative elections
Party competition
Local faction
Vote-distribution of candidates
Constituency

Abstract

This paper examines representative behavior of Taiwan's legislators and the reasons for their representative behavior. The representative behavior is divided into two categories: activities in the Legislative Yuan and activities in constituencies. Some researchers argue that these two categories of representative behavior are a trade-off, because legislators' resources are limited. Others argue that making efforts on one of these two categories of activities may reduce pressure from the other one. However, this paper indicates that these two arguments are not true for Taiwan's legislators. Based on a survey on legislators' assistants and a content analysis up-on Legislative gazettes, this paper shows that the relationship of these two categories of behavior is not necessarily negative. That is to say, the legislators who make efforts in the Legislative Yuan may not necessarily ignore the constituencies. On the contrary, the legislators who make efforts in the constituencies may not necessarily ignore the activities in the Legislative Yuan.Secondly, the research findings indicate that individual legislators must have some expectations on their representative roles, and hence these expectations affect their choices on legislative career, either pays more attention to law-making or to constituency services. Meanwhile, these expectations are affected by the factors related to legislators' party, constituency, and their own political purposes and resources. Furthermore, comparing these influential factors, I find that the factors related to the constituency are the most important. The legislators whose votes are concentrated on a certain part of the electoral district tend to make more efforts in constituencies. On the other hand, the legislators whose votes are scattered across the electoral district tend to make more efforts in the Legislative Yuan. Meanwhile, the research findings show that the following factors affect legislators' representative behavior: party affiliation, the degree of intra-party competition, political purposes, seniority, whether holding a party position, and the activities in committees.

Keywords

legislative behavior
representation
constituency service
law-making
legislators' political purposes

Abstract

Party and constituency are two major forces faced by legislators. They influence legislators' representative behavior in different degrees and in different ways. This paper examines how these two forces influence Taiwanese legislators' representative styles and behavior. Research findings show that the representative styles of Taiwan's legislators have changed radically since the mid-1980s.Many legislators changed from a party-oriented style to a constituency-oriented style. This paper suggests a possible reason for this radical change. Legislators have to build their personal vote because they face intensive party competition resulted from the emergence of an opposition party, the DPP. The legislators under a single non-transferable vote system cannot count only on their party to get re-election. Most of them have to show their distinctive characteristics and hard-working in the legislative Yuan and in their constituency. They may even deviate from the party line to get attention and support from their constituencies sometimes. Based on a case study on the third term of legislators, this research has several findings. First, approximately two-thirds of the legislators are constituency-oriented, and less than one-third of the legislators are party-oriented. Secondly, the representative orientations of legislators affect their representative behavior profoundly. Party-oriented legislators make more efforts in the law-making process, while constituency-oriented legislators make more efforts in their constituencies. Meanwhile, the party-oriented legislators follow the party line more than their constituency-oriented fellows do. Thirdly, the representative orientations of individual legislators are affected by their vote-getting styles, party affiliation, and constituency styles. The legislators who rely more on their constituency than party to get re-election, the legislators of KMT, and the legislators from homogeneous constituencies, are more likely to be constituency-oriented.

Keywords

SNTV electoral system
representative orientations
representative behavior
party in legislatures
constituency

Abstract

Calling for electoral reform is particularly harsh in the recent years, especially after President Chen announced to adopt Single-Member Constituency Parallel System for the forthcoming general elections after the Conference for Governmental Reform on 5th May 2002. Unfortunately, comparison studies on alternative methods are still few. In order to advance understandings on concerned circumstances, this article tries to analyse and compare political consequences, reform effects and feasibilities of major alternative systems, i. e. Single-Member Constituency Parallel System, Mixed-Member Proportional (MMP), Medium-Sized Constituency Parallel System, and Open-list Proportional Representation, called by different parties in the congress.

Keywords

Electoral System
Electoral Reform
Single-Member Constituency Parallel System
Mixed-Member Proportional
Medium-Size Constituency Parallel System
Open-list Proportional Representation

Abstract

The axis of this paper is legislators' reelections, and the purpose is to explore legislators' reelections under SNTV electoral system. At the beginning, this paper discusses the fourth legislators' reelections in the fifth legislative election then examines the relationship between the major four factors, including party, personal performance, local faction and constituency, and legislators' reelections in order to find out the important variables of affecting legislators' reelections. Finally, this paper will use binary logistic model to build ”the model of legislators' reelections” for comparing the degree of all the variables affecting legislators' reelections. Research findings show that among all the four factors, party and personal performance are the most critical ones affecting the fourth legislators' reelections in the fifth legislative election. Speaking precisely, the nomination of party and legislators' performances (including legislative performance, services of the constituency and the news-exposures in term), which compare with the other legislators' in the same constituency are the important variables affecting legislators' reelection.

Keywords

SNTV electoral system
legislator
reelection
party
personal performance
local faction
constituency

Abstract

Political machines are built to distribute spoils, buy support, and influence election outcome. Existing research argues that political machines target poor and illiterate voters because their votes are cheap to acquire with non-programmatic benefits. Using the case of Hong Kong, we critically examine the extent to which the ruling coalition utilizes non-programmatic benefits in elections where votes are generally too expensive to purchase. Using interviews with local councilors and data from the 2015 Hong Kong Election Study, we find that: (1) pro-Beijing parties tend to specialize in the provision of highly individualized services; (2) demand for these services tends to come from non-poor citizens; and (3) unable to monitor individual votes, pro-Beijing parties use services and benefits to influence the turnout of the recipients, rather than their vote choice. These findings suggest that the growing electoral strength of pro-Beijing parties in Hong Kong reflects their responsiveness to constituent demands.

Keywords

constituency services
non-programmatic benefits
Hong Kong elections
machine politics
pro-Beijing parties