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Abstract
The purpose of this article is to discuss whether the evaluation of economiccondition in electorate influences the voting choice.The election inTaiwan,with the bad economic condition,do the economic voting exist?When the electorate evaluate that the economic performance is bad,willthey punish the ruling party by their votes?We will discuss the relationbetween the evaluation of economic conditions and voting choices,attributivetheory and the heterogeneity of economic voting.From the discoveryof this article,there is obvious difference between personal and nationalevaluation of economic conditions and voting choices.In the multinomialvoting model,the economic evaluation that affects the votingchoices is not the main factor.Therefore,by using attributive theory andsample choosing,I find some electorate who has the economic votingcharacter.But in the testing of the heterogeneity of economic voting,politicaltrust and the national economic evaluation don't exist the interaction.The effect of economic evaluation to the voting decision doesn't beaffected by political trust.We can know that there is heterogeneity in theeconomic voting of Taiwan electorate.However,what kind of variablecauses the effect is the main continuous issue.
Abstract
Observing the process of the recent elections in Taiwan, we found that different political parties often negotiated with each other for the possibility of cooperation. Each party would decide whether to cooperate or not. This paper develops a threeparty game theoretical model of single-seat elections to analyze the conditions under which that minor political party would agree to cooperate with major political parties, and discusses the rationality of decision from each political party. According to the equilibrium results, cooperation between political parties only occurs when certain conditions are met. The cooperative partner is not restricted to the most powerful party. In addition, there is a separating equilibrium in the case of asymmetric information. This leads to the conclusion that the larger difference between the strong type and the weak type of the major political party is, the more common minor political party would cooperate with the weak type of the major political party. Moreover, no cooperation takes place when the minor political party has zero cost in political elections.
