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Abstract
This research is focused on the relationship between the disparitiesof urban-suburb development and political factions in TaipeiCounty.We hypothesize that the more urbanization of a town or avillage,the more political influence of a local faction in it.We usealmost all the avaliable indicators to measure the urbanization,which is the independent variable of this research.And,we calculatethe vote rate of every local political faction in 1998 TaipeiCounty Councilman election and Town Mayor election,as the indicesof their political influence,which is the dependent variable ofthis work.The finding of this research will be useful to systematizethe modeling of Taiwan local faction analysis.
Abstract
It is believed that almost every Town's District Committee of Mediation in Taiwan is dominated by local factions and the committee members are the important figures within their factions. In this research, based on the assumption that the Committee members are convenient to access political, social and economic interests, we hypothesize that in Taipei County the more powerful a local political faction is the more intervention it has toward the District Committee of Mediation. Therefore, we use 3 models to examine the relationship between local political factions and the District Committee of Mediation by statistic datum, such as the amounts of mediation cases, the successful rate of mediation and soon. However, through depth interviews to 8 committee members and 3 clergies in different Towns of Taipei County which provides not only the quantitative explanations but the qualitative analysis for this research. The author expects that students of Taiwan's local political factions research will have mo0re refined models contributed by this paper to duplicate further studies.
Abstract
It is generally believed that some political factions are patrons to gangsters in Taiwan's local politics. In order to investigate this proposition we chose Taipei County as a case study. We define the gangsters are those who were convicted by the Preventive Provisions Against Organized Crimes. There are 1 4 this sort of persons right now in Taipei and Tauyuan jails. We have interviewed with all these gangsters. Complementarily, we also have interviewed with 8 police officials whose major duty is responsible to gang affairs. Moreover, we have interviewed with other 19 people, mostly who are politicians in Taipei country. The informants, especially gang criminals, confirm that within the campaigning, they help to do vote-buying, mobilize voters and consolidate voters' supports for some certain candidates. More importantly, some of these candidates are politicians in local factions. But, politicians in any local faction might be gangsters; local political factions are never gangs. Local faction and gang are not the head and tail of a coin. Therefore, the determinant of Taipei County politics is still at the hands of local factions and not belonging to gangs. However, the coefficient relationship between the candidates with gang background and their vote rates are significantly positive. It reveals that there is a serious problem in Taiwan's local politics of gangster's participation into election. Paradoxically, there is no significant coefficient among the dependent variable--vote rate and the independent variables-gang background, political party and faction. It tells us that even a gangster with the nomination from a political party or in the recommendation of any local faction may not have benefits from it. Gangsters win elections only because of themselves. To conclude, if a political party or a local political faction wants to make a clear-cut demarcation with gangsters, it is possible and will not get damage from it.
