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Abstract

This paper employs qualitative data collected through focus group and in-depth interviews during the period of 2000-2021. The proposed research aims to explore how Taiwanese people define and interpret “Taiwanese”, “Chinese” and “both Taiwanese and Chinese (dual identities)”, and also to clarify people’s identity target and boundary. The result shows that Taiwanese people’s identity contents are continuous and concentrated in the Taiwan- centered “we group” consciousness. The primordialist ties with China persists, yet most of them are regarded as objective facts and cannot be generated or converted into the “we group” consciousness. The major change is that the Chinese consciousness has almost disappeared from popular discourse. Our data also shows that many Taiwanese people have treated Taiwan (Republic of China) as the “we group”, and China (People’s Republic of China) as the “they group”. This finding indicates that Taiwan identity has reached the stage of national identity in terms of boundary setting. The gradual clarity and elevationed consciousness of national identity impliesy that Taiwan has the tendency of reaching a collective identity.

Abstract

This paper examines the nature and its correlated characteris-tics of what has been popularly termed "Lee Teng-hui complex" in Taiwan's political discourse in the 1990s by an analysis of available post-electoral survey data sets collected between 1994 and 1996. As measured by a set political affect toward President Lee Teng-hui, our findings show that Lee Teng-hui complex is a kind of stable mass political psyche mainly reflecting a pride of being Taiwanese as well as Chinese. Moreover, Lee Teng-hui complex is ascer-tained to be a syndrome as it is found to have significant and posi-tive correlation with two sets of polarized and negatively related po-litical attitudes that taping so-called "Taiwan mind" and "China con-cerns" respectively at the same time. A conjecture in electoral campaign that ascribes Taiwanese' s Lee Teng-hui complex as a psy-chological foundation in supporting Taiwan independence is there-fore empirically ungrounded with the available data, given that Lee Teng-hui is the first and foremost Taiwanese President. Thirdly, ethnicity, Taiwanese pride, China concerns are all found to be sig-nificant predictors of Lee Teng-hui complex, and the causal effects are held consistent against different data sets in point. Finally, with multinomial logit analysis, Lee Teng-hui complex is found as a consistent and significant psychological factor, along with party i-dentification, in directing voter's final vote-choice in recent elec-tions, especially in the presidential election held in 1995 in which in-cumbent President Lee Teng-hui involved.

Abstract

Ethnic and identity problems are important issues in modern Taiwanese politics. This paper examines Taiwanese identity from the aspect of ethnic and identity theory. The author develops a ”Taiwanese consciousness” index to explore the effect of identity in the past four presidential elections. The results show that Taiwanese consciousness has increased year by year, with more than half (54.7%) of Taiwan voters now classified into the high level of Taiwanese consciousness. The data also show that people with different degrees of Taiwanese consciousness vote differently and are increasingly polarized around identity. People with high-level Taiwanese consciousness tend to vote for pan-green candidates, while people with lowlevel Taiwanese consciousness tend to vote for pan-blue candidates. The data also indicate that the support bases of different parties are quite different. Votes for pan-green candidates mostly come from people with high-level Taiwanese consciousness, and this fraction has steadily increased; at the same time, support for pan-blue candidates has fallen significantly among this group. The analysis shows that partisan identification performs better than the ”Taiwanese consciousness” index at predicting vote choice, but the ”Taiwanese consciousness” index still has additional explanatory power. This paper also finds that the effect of ”sengi” (voters' provincial background) is not significant in the four presidential elections after controlling for other variables. This result suggests that the identity issue in Taiwan is now more an expression of ideological differences than ethnic ones.

Abstract

This paper aims to examine the test-retest reliability of two important political attitudes, i.e. Taiwanese/Chinese identity and issue of Unification/ Independence (UI issue), among the Taiwanese electorate by analyzing the 2004-2008 panel data from the Taiwan Election and Democratization Study. This paper further explores the socio-demographic factors that might affect the consistence of one's Taiwanese/Chinese identity and the position of the issue of Unification/Independence. This paper then examines the relationship between the two political attitudes.The findings suggest that one's Taiwanese/Chinese identity demonstrates higher stability than his/her position on the UI issue. People who identified themselves as Chinese changed to having a ”joint identity”. Those who hold a ”joint identity” have changed to identified themselves as Taiwanese. The factors that affect one's attitude consistency include education, political generation and China experience. Those with less education, the oldest generation and have been to China are more likely to change their attitudes. Moreover, findings from the statistical model show that one's Taiwanese/Chinese identity influences one's position on the UI issue.

Abstract

Although public opinion in Taiwan is increasingly in favor of gay rights, there is no corresponding trend at the elite level and no concrete policy changes have been achieved. Based on the logic of electoral competition and political socialization, this paper takes the 2014 elections for municipal councilors in Taiwan as an example and examines the factors influencing support for LGBT equality among local politicians. Theoretically, although the centrifugal effect of the SNTV system motivates candidates of the same party to differ from each other on a variety of issues, political socialization, on the contrary, encourages a more unified issue stance taken among party members. The results of multilevel models suggest that there is little linkage between the characteristics of constituents, the electoral rule, and candidates’ stances on gay rights. However, both partisanship and age play an indispensable role. Candidates who are members of the DPP or one of the liberal parties are more likely to support LGBT rights than their KMT counterparts.

Abstract

One of the problems with empirical studies of Taiwanese/Chinese identity in Taiwan is the use of over-simplified measurements based on responses to a question involving three choices: is your nationality Taiwanese, Chinese, or both? This study attempts to produce a new model with a more fine-grained conceptualization of national identity in Taiwan. The model is derived from Rawi Abdelal et al.’s idea of social identity, and applies Partial Least Squares Structural Equation Modeling (PLS-SEM) to survey data, to develop a social psychological framework using three independent latent variables: “national norms,” “national closeness,” and “national purposes,” and a single dependent latent variable: “state identity.” The results of this re-analysis show all three of the independent variables have significant positive correlations with the dependent variable “state identity.” Of the independent variables, national norms has the highest total effect.
For respondents self-identifying as Taiwanese (T respondents) and respondents self-identifying as Chinese (C respondents), there were significant differences in two dimensions: national purposes and national norms. The strength of T respondents’ national purposes is higher than C respondents while the strength of C respondents’ national norms is higher than T respondents. In addition, a comparison of total effect value and outer weight found that T respondents and respondents self-identifying as both Taiwanese and Chinese (B respondents) also differed. Both T and B respondents stress on “state-building,” a component of the latent variable national purposes. For the dependent variable state identity, however, B and T respondents differ. T respondents take a pro-Taiwan and anti-unification stance. B respondents, however, take a pro-“Republic of China” and prodemocratic unification stance. Variables such as age, education, and social contacts all have moderating effects for both T and B respondents but not great enough to change the path direction.