If China adopts economic, diplomatic, and military strategies toward Taiwan, do these strategies explain the differences in Taiwanese people’s image of China? Do these effects vary across different periods? Using “Image Theory” as the theoretical framework, we explore whether China’s provision of economic benefits, allowance of Taiwan’s diplomatic activities without restrictions, and removal of missiles targeting Taiwan contribute to the more favorable attitude of China among the Taiwanese public and subsequently shape their image of China. We further examine whether these policies had differing effects during the relatively positive cross-strait relations in 2014 compared to the strained relations in 2021. This study utilizes the 2014 and 2021 nationwide telephone surveys of Image of China and the “Ordered Logit Model” to analyze the correlations between the three policies and the image of China. Empirical findings reveal that in both years, individuals who felt more favorable toward China due to its provision of more significant economic benefits were also more likely to hold a positive image of China. However, China’s lack of restrictions on Taiwan’s diplomatic activities and removal of missiles targeting Taiwan failed to have any effect. The results suggest that offering economic benefits best explains the differences in Taiwanese people’s image of China. We conclude that because China has previously provided Taiwan with economic benefits, crossstrait economic ties remain challenging to decouple. Furthermore, under the premise of unification, economic benefits are the most feasible concession China can offer Taiwan, as it is unlikely to ease its diplomatic containment or military threats. Hence, economic benefits best explain the differences in Taiwanese perceptions of China.

The emergence of China as a first-tier world power is a critical issue both politically and economically, but what is often overlooked is how more frequent interaction with China influences public opinion. This study is aimed at assessing two competing approaches, “contact” theory and “group threat” theory, in an effort to understand how exposure to and contact with China influence Taiwanese citizens’ impressions of China. More specifically, it focuses on how, as cross-Strait relations develop, the public in Taiwan may either have positive views or negative feelings toward China. Methodologically, in addition to the objective measurement of contact (exposure to China) employed in the previous literature, the paper uses a subjective measurement of contact (willingness to interact with China). This study analyzes both individual-level and aggregate-level datasets in the models; in doing this, it takes advantage of a 2014 nationwide telephone survey and considers the effects of the regional context. The findings demonstrate that the subjective measurement shows more variance in public opinion on China than the objective measure, and the contextual variables exert conditional influences upon Taiwanese people’s overall disposition toward China. The results by and large confirm the validity of contact theory, but also indicate that it is too simplistic and straightforward, and therefore in need of revision. The data reveal that greater exposure is not enough to foster greater trust and cooperation between the two sides; it is increased willingness to interact that creates more favorable impressions.