Journal of Electoral Studies

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Home Issues Backissues Volume 31, No.1 Electoral Decisions for Political Party and Its Un-nominated Aspirants

Electoral Decisions for Political Party and Its Un-nominated Aspirants

Hsiao-Chien Tsui and Chung-Li Wu
2007 / 05
Volume 14, No.1

pp.119-143
10.6612/tjes.2007.14.01.119-143

Abstract

In any given election, aspirants without party approvals still have the incentive to run as independent candidates. In the face of the competition with patty nominees, unsuccessful aspirants could insist on campaigning against nominating candidates or determine to withdraw from the contests. The purpose of this study is to examine the reasons for unsuccessful aspirants decide to run as candidates or to withdraw from elections. It is hypothesized that both political patties and aspirants are rational decision makers in an attempt to minimize electoral costs and meanwhile maximize the benefits. The aspirants without party blessings could decide not to run in elections if they calculate that the fixed electoral costs exceed the expected payoffs. This study employs a three-stage game model to reach some corollaries based on the subgame perfect equilibriums for political parties and unnominated aspirants. The findings reveal that political parties are always unable to deter unsuccessful aspirants from being independent candidates, and then one common strategy is to boycott the aspirants in the elections. However, political patties could learn that adopting defense tactics will pay more costs than tolerating the aspirants to run as mavericks. As a result, the unsuccessful aspirants should wage campaign activities when they perceive that political parties claiming to use deterrent strategies are just bluffs and therefore ”incredible threats.”

Keywords

electoral decision

electoral mobilization

party nomination

rational choice