Journal of Electoral Studies

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Home Issues Backissues Volume 31, No.1 Power Division, Voting Rule, and Party System: What Do We See When They Are Considered Together?

Power Division, Voting Rule, and Party System: What Do We See When They Are Considered Together?

Jih-Wen Lin
2006 / 11
Volume 13, No.2

pp.1-35
10.6612/tjes.2006.13.02.01-35

Abstract

Institutions are usually embedded in each other and can hardly be analyzed independently. Existing studies, by aggregating the effect of individual institutions to assess their overall influence, could underestimate the impact at the systematic level when the institutions are considered together. Multipartism, for instance, may shorten government duration under the parliamentary system, but enhance the administrative power if presidentialism is used. In line with existing institutional studies, this paper derives several propositions regarding the impact of institutional configuration on political stability. Bipartism can result to diverse outcomes when it is used under parliamentarism or presidentialism, and electoral cycle plays a crucial role in determining political stability when a president is in charge. These propositions are then applied to forecast Taiwan's constitutional future. The latest constitutional revision set up a high threshold for further amendment to be reconsidered by the people, making semi-presidentialism and a single-member-district biased electoral system the defining features of Taiwan's constitutional structure. Since this combination could lead to the greatest and the lowest stability, electoral cycle will be critically influencing Taiwan's constitutional prospect.

Keywords

constitutional choice

electoral system

party system

electoral cycle

government efficiency