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Home Issues Backissues Volume 31, No.1 Behind the Corruption Voting: A Rational Trading Explanation

Behind the Corruption Voting: A Rational Trading Explanation

Ding-Ming Wang
2004 / 05
Volume 11, No.1

pp.99-126
10.6612/tjes.2004.11.01.99-126
Paper

Abstract

Previous studies on the corruption have been focused on specific settings of the institutions and social structures. This paper, con the contrary, emphasizes on the individual voters and is aimed to explain why do voters support for the corrupted parties. Based on the ”implicit trading theory” proposed by Barry S. Rundquist et al. (1977), Conditional Logit analysis is estimated to understand the Taiwanese voting behavior. The result shows that the party's corruption imagines has a negative effect to draw votes. While this negative effect can also be minimized if the party proposes the attractive policy platforms. That is to say, voters will compromise to the corrupted parties for their policy preferences. As for the specific effect to each party, it is the KMT that the corruption imagines has the minimum influence, comparing to DPP and NP.

Keywords

corruption

issue voting

implicit trading

choice specific variable