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Homenavigate_nextIssuesnavigate_nextBackissuesnavigate_nextVolume 31, No.1navigate_nextContinuity and Change in Nomination for Party-list Candidates: A Case Study of Taiwan
Continuity and Change in Nomination for Party-list Candidates: A Case Study of Taiwan
Before Taiwan’s Seventh Constitutional Amendment in 2005, there existed a system of party-list legislators (so-called “at-large legislators”), but voters could only vote for district legislators. After electoral reform, voters can now cast a separate two votes for their preferred district legislator and a political party. This study contends that the electoral reform incentivized parties to nominate “quality candidates” for the party list to garner voter recognition. This study analyzes the characteristics of party-list candidates from 1992 to 2024 who took part in ten congressional elections, and specifically focuses on the political recruitment of major parties in Taiwan. This research finds that parties recruited more highly educated candidates, reduced nominations of incumbent legislators, and increased nominations of a broader spectrum of candidates from various professions and social groups after the electoral reform. However, when examining the difference between a “realistic list” (“safe list”) and a “symbolic list” (“unsafe list”), parties have tended to prefer to place incumbent legislators on the realistic list, no matter before or after the electoral reform. Furthermore, when focusing only on the major parties, particularly the Kuomintang and the Democratic Progressive Party, it has been observed that after the electoral reform, they not only increased the nomination of professionals and social group representatives but also showed no significant difference in the placement of various occupations on either the realistic or symbolic lists. This indicates that the major parties did indeed nominate a more diverse societal representation in the post-reform period. However, veteran legislators and candidates with backgrounds in local or party factions still have had a higher chance of being included in the realistic list. This suggests that even after the electoral reform, the party list system has not been able to fully escape its role in balancing internal political forces within the parties.
