Journal of Electoral Studies

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Home Issues Backissues Volume 31, No.2 Game-Theoretic Analysis of Making a Concession Decision in an Election

Game-Theoretic Analysis of Making a Concession Decision in an Election

Jue-shyan Wang, Fu-yu Yan, and Mei-yin Lin
2019 / 11
Volume 26, No.2

pp.01-22
10.6612/tjes.201911_26(2).0001
Paper

Abstract

In Taiwan, a phenomenon commonly occurs that the candidates of a political party yield to other candidates in election campaigns. This paper establishes a model of game theory in which candidates can decide whether to make a concession in an election when the candidates of another party with similar attributes are running for election. In the case of candidates who do not know the capability of other party candidates, it is easier for candidates to start the concession mechanism when the proportion of a strong type among the other candidates is large and when the candidates from another party concede more benefits.

Keywords

concession election

party integration

sequential equilibrium